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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: A COMITY
OF ERRORS
BARBARA A. BELL
THE INTERNATIONAL AVIATION industry exerts a
significant impact on the economy of the United States
and on the economy of the world. In 1986, International
Air Transport Association (IATA) members' carried
155,778,000 passengers a total of 473,490,000 kilometers
on international flights.2 In the same year, IATA mem-
bers earned revenues of $45,700,000 billion. Because of
the significant impact international aviation exerts on the
economy, the United States is concerned with competitive
practices in the industry.4 As a general rule, the United
States regulates competition through antitrust laws. The
United States contends that its antitrust laws apply to con-
, The International Air Transport Association is an international trade associa-
tion of passenger and cargo carrying airlines. The IATA engages in various coor-
dinating functions. In 1987, one hundred sixty-one airlines were members of the
IATA. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS. Ass'N, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 14-15 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 REPORT].
Id. at 11.
I ld. at 5.
This concern is highlighted, for example, in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502(b) (1982)
which provides in part:
In formulating United States international air transportation policy,
the Congress intends that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Transportation, and the Civil Aeronautics Board shall develop a ne-
gotiating policy which emphasizes the greatest degree of competi-
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duct even outside the United States.5 Airlines, however,
have traditionally been immunized from the antitrust laws
through statutory antitrust exemptions and provisions in
treaties and bilateral agreements.6 Thus, airlines have
been able to engage in activities which would almost cer-
tainly be declared illegal in other industries.7
The continued existence of these exemptions has re-
cently become doubtful. Much of the authority of the De-
partment of Transportation to grant exemptions from the
antitrust laws expires on January 1, 1989.8 Senator How-
ard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio) has introduced the Airline
Competition Act of 1987 which would apply antitrust laws
to the aviation industry.9 There is a real possibility that
the antitrust liability of international airlines will be
greatly expanded.' 0
tion that is compatible with a well-functioning international air
transportation system. This includes, among other things:
(2) freedom of air carriers and foreign air carriers to offer fares
and rates which correspond with consumer demand;
(5) the elimination of operational and marketing restrictions to
the greatest extent possible ....
Id.
See infra notes 51-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extrater-
ritorial reach of United States antitrust law.
6 See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of relevant anti-
trust exemptions.
7 For example, through the JATA airlines engage in rate setting and revenue
pooling agreements which could probably be characterized as price-fixing and
market division in other industries. Tompkins, The North Atlantic-Competition or
Confrontation. The Potential Impact of United States Antitrust Law on International Air
Transportation, 7 AIR L. 48, 60-61 (1982). Other activities which may be suspect
include exchanging cost, price and customer data, agreements among carriers to
accept other carriers' passenger tickets and baggage checks, credit arrangements
among airlines and price cutting through rebates. P. BARLOW, AVIATION A~rri-
TRUST 66-67 (1988). Barlow extensively analyzes the possible antitrust violations
in international aviation. Id. at 65-69.
$ 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a)(6) (Supp. 1II 1985).
S. 806, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S3619 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
1987). In relevant part the bill provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of
law . . . the Sherman Act shall apply to the air transportation industry .... This
Act, as such Act applies to overseas air transportation, shall become effective on
January 1, 1989." Id. at S3619-20.
- P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 40. "[O]nly one concluding remark can be made
Naturally, the airline industry is not enthusiastic about
this possibility. Both the 1985 and 1986 Annual Reports
of the IATA highlight the industry's concern with "[t]he
gradual but persistent extension of the use by govern-
ments of domestic competition laws in the field of interna-
tional aviation ... .'t The International Civil Aviation
Organization strongly condemns the application of local
competition laws to international aviation. 12
To compound the problem, a number of the United
States' allies have reacted negatively to the possibility that
United States antitrust laws might be applied to their air-
lines. Among the most vocal are the British, who have re-
peatedly called for the immunization of British airlines
from the United States antitrust laws.' 3 In an attempt to
avoid the United States antitrust laws, several countries,
including Great Britain, have enacted blocking statutes.
These statutes allow foreign governmental officials to
prohibit their country's nationals from cooperating with
United States courts.' 4 The statutes often further provide
for the recovery of antitrust judgments enforced in the
with certainty. That is that there will be greater antitrust exposure in the years
following deregulation." Id.
" INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS. Ass'N, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter 1986 REPORT]; see also INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS. ASS'N, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT
14 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 REPORT].'
- ICAO Doc. 9297, AT-Conf/2 at 35 (1980). The organization believes that
"unilateral actions which disrupt multilateral tariff negotiations ... place interna-
tional co-operation in peril and, through their destabilizing influence, threaten
the economic performance of the international aviation system as a whole." Id.
I See generally British Reject New Fares, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 29, 1984, at
30, 30-31 (British refused to approve new fare proposals until antitrust immunity
was guaranteed); Brown, British Transport Minister Decries Bermuda 2 Pact, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 5, 1984, at 26, 26-27 (British Secretary of State for transport
declared air services agreement vitually unworkable because U.S. refused antitrust
immunity); British Reject Low Fares Despite U.S. Action, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov.
12, 1984, at 81 (British sought agreement limiting antitrust liability).
,4 See, e.g, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 3 (1984) (allowing Commonwealth Attorney
General to prohibit enforcement of foreign antitrust judgments and allowing
Commonwealth Attorney General to prohibit Australians from giving evidence);
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (allowing the British Secretary of
State to prohibit compliance with any requirements of foreign courts if it infringes
the sovereignty of the United Kingdom).
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United States.1 5
This comment discusses the problems of applying
United States antitrust law to international aviation. The
first section discusses the antitrust background of interna-
tional aviation, focusing on various threats of liability for
international aviation.16 The second section considers the
current status of the extraterritorial application of the
United States antitrust laws. 17 The third section summa-
rizes criticisms of the federal courts' recently developed
comity analysis.' 8 Finally, the fourth section rejects the
currently espoused comity analysis and proposes an anal-
ysis focusing on jurisdictional contacts.
I. BACKGROUND: THE AVIATION INDUSTRY'S ANTITRUST
EXPERIENCE
In most countries, bilateral and multilateral air trans-
port agreements regulate the activities of international air
carriers. t 9 These agreements cover many facets of airline
operations and often include provisions related to the es-
tablishment of tariffs. 20 Generally, the carriers have the
responsibility for negotiating proposed rates. The carri-
ers submit these proposed rates to the governments who
are parties to the agreement for approval. 2'
As a result of the air transport agreement system, the
emphasis in international air carriage is on non-price
15 These provisions are commonly known as clawback provisions. Both Great
Britain and Australia have clawback laws. For examples of clawback provisions,
see AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 3 (1984) (allowing recovery of antitrust judgments paid in
foreign countries); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (providing
for recovery of multiple damage awards).
- See infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interna-
tional aviation industry antitrust history.
11 See infra notes 51-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extrater-
ritorial application of the United State antitrust laws.
' See infra notes 134-172 and accompanying text for a discussion of criticisms
of the comity analysis.
I! Dempsey, The Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization on Deregulation,
Discrimination and Dispute Resolution, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 529, 541-47 (1987).
,- Id. at 542.
21 Id.
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rather than price competition.2 2 Ordinarily, the elimina-
tion of price competition is a per se violation of the anti-
trust laws. 23  However, until recently, rate-setting and
similar airline activities have not been subject to antitrust
scrutiny in the United States.24
The Federal Aviation Act of 195825 grants the Depart-
ment of Transportation regulatory power over numerous
aspects of competition in international air commerce 26 in-
cluding consolidations and mergers, 27  pooling agree-
ments, 28 and mutual aid agreements. 29  The Department
of Transportation is required to evaluate proposed trans-
actions between carriers to determine whether the an-
ticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions
outweigh the efficiencies of the arrangements.3 0 The De-
partment of Transportation may not approve agreements
between carriers that limit capacity or fix rates other than
joint rates.3
22 Tompkins, supra note 7, at 60.
23 Id. at 57-58. Per se violations of the antitrust laws are "agreements or prac-
tices . . . so plainly anticompetitive that they are declared unlawful without an
elaborate inquiry into the precise harm caused." P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 47.
24 Tompkins at 58. However, from 1978 to 1985 the IATA rate-making confer-
ences were the subject of a Civil Aeronautics Board Show Cause Order. See U.S.
Closes Proceeding to Withdraw Antitrust Immunity from IA TA Meetings, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., May 20, 1985, at 43. The effect of the order would have been to prevent
United States carriers from participating in IATA rate-making meetings. Id.
However, the order was withdrawn when the Department of Transportation took
over the functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Department of Transpor-
tation concluded that "IATA fare agreements substantially reduced competition
but that antitrust immunity of fare-setting was required because of international
comity and foreign policy considerations." Id. Critics of the Civil Aeronautics
Board Sunset Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (Supp. III 1985), feared that the result of
transferring antitrust exemption authority to a "highly political agency" would
result in less effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. CAB Sunset Bill Passes De-
spite Antitrust Question, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 1, 1984, at 33. The Depart-
ment of Transportation's dismissal of the Civil Aeronautics Board Show Cause
Order tends to indicate that some of these fears may have come true.
25 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
26 For a thorough discussion of the Department of Transportation's regulatory
authority and philosophy, see P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 34-40.
27 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378 (1982).
28 49 U.S.C. app. § 1382 (1982).
29 Id.
3o 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1378, 1379, 1382 (1982).
31 49 U.S.C. app. § 1382(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1982).
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Because the Department of Transportation has such a
high degree of control over the competitive activities of
international airlines, the Department of Transportation
has the authority to exempt certain approved anticompeti-
tive conduct to the extent necessary to allow the airline to
engage in the approved transaction.3 2  In light of Con-
gress' expressed preference for the maintenance of com-
petition in the airline industry, it might seem unusual that
Congress would authorize antitrust exemptions for merg-
ers, interlocking boards, and pooling agreements. How-
ever, in replacing free competition with regulation,
Congress has expressed the opinion that the market can-
not adequately control competition in aviation.3
Although the Department of Transportation may im-
munize anticompetitive conduct, international air carriers
are not entirely free from the reach of the antitrust laws.
In virtually any case, the question of whether the Depart-
ment of Transportation authorized the particular conduct
in question can still arise.3 4 Further, even if the Depart-
ment of Transportation specifically authorized a given
transaction, the transaction may not be entirely free from
judicial review.3 5 A court may find, for instance, that the
Department of Transportation did not have the authority
32 49 U.S.C. app. § 1384 (1982). In relevant part the statute provides:
In any order made under section 1378 [mergers and consolidations],
1379 [interlocking boards] or 1382 [pooling and other agreements]
of this Appendix, the Board may, as part of such order, exempt any
person affected by such order from the operation of the "antitrust
laws" . . . to the extent necessary to enable such person to proceed
with the transaction specifically approved by the Board in such order
and those transactions necessarily contemplated by such order, ex-
cept that the Board may not exempt such person unless it deter-
mines that such exemption is required in the public interest.
Id.
I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRIN-
CIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 222, at 134 (1978).
I4 d. at 135.
s5 id. at 135-36. The fact that it is an agency rather than a court granting anti-
trust immunity may lead to different outcomes. Areeda and Turner note that
"notwithstanding agency consideration of competitive values and the antitrust
court's consideration of industry peculiarities, allocating a balancing decision to
an agency will often produce a judgment different from what would have resulted
by entrusting that decision in the first instance to an antitrust court." Id. at 136.
[54
1988] COMMENTS 539
to authorize the activity in question. 6 Thus, Department
of Transportation conferred immunity is not a license to
engage in all types of anticompetitive behavior.
Nevertheless, from the airlines' perspective, these anti-
trust immunities, as subject to uncertainty as they may be,
are superior to no immunity at all. Unfortunately for the
airlines, Congress is becoming increasingly averse to avia-
tion antitrust immunity. Much of the Department of
Transportation's authority to immunize conduct from an-
titrust scrutiny expires on January 1, 1989. 37 Although
Congress has not yet indicated that it will permanently
withdraw antitrust immunity from international aviation,38
there are indications that the immunity provisions may be
allowed to fade into history. In March 1987, Senator
Howard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio) introduced a bill to im-
mediately end antitrust immunity for the domestic avia-
tion industry and to withdraw international aviation
antitrust immunity on January 1, 1989. 39
36 Id. at 146. Areeda and Turner discuss the problem of agency antitrust immu-
nization using aviation as an example. "[A]greements among air carriers are im-
mune from the antitrust laws when approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board. But
even there, many problems remain. An antitrust court may have to decide what
precisely had been approved by the administrators and how far the antitrust shield
that accompanies approval extends." Id. (footnotes omitted).
:, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a)(6)-(7) (Supp. III 1985).
8 The legislative history of The Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act indicates
that "[t]his sunset date will give Congress an opportunity to consider at that time
whether there is still a need for administrative regulation of air carrier mergers
and acquisitions and whether there is still a need for statutory authority to grant
certain air carrier transactions immunity from the atntitrust [sic] laws." H.R. REP.
No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2857, 2867. The report further notes: "The establishing of a sunset date
for these authorities should not be construed as an indication that the Committee
has reached a decision on whether the authorities should be renewed after they
sunset." Id.
59 S. 806, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S3619 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
1987). For the text of the bill, see supra note 9. Introducing his bill, Senator
Metzenbaum stated:
[T]he airline industry is a cozy oligopoly. More carriers enjoy mo-
nopoly power on more routes than ever before.
... If we really want the airlines to compete by offering low fares
and better service, it's time we ended the antitrust moratorium for
the airlines. I urge my colleagues to join me in this effort to make
sure that the airlines understand that their free ride is over.
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Obviously, in light of the uncertainty surrounding De-
partment of Transportation antitrust immunity, it is rea-
sonable that the airline industry has sought to persuade
the executive branches of both the United States and for-
eign governments that antitrust immunity should be in-
cluded in air service agreements.40 Yet even if an antitrust
provision were included in an air service agreement, the
United States antitrust laws could still apply. The reason
for this result is that unless the United States Senate con-
sented to the air service agreement, the agreement would
be merely an executive agreement, not a treaty. 4 I A po-
tential problem thus arises. Under the foreign law, the air
service agreement is a treaty, but under United States law
the air service agreement does not supersede the antitrust
laws.42
Id.
4o See 1985 REPORT, supra note 11, at 14. The IATA has indicated that it "will
press for intergovernmental agreement on guidelines for resolution of disputes
arising in this context and possible development of a standard bilateral clause."
Id.
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 comment a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Under the United
States Constitution, the President has the power to make treaties with foreign
nations "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur .... " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The
Restatement explains the effect of executive agreements. "Like treaties and other
international agreements, they can be superseded as domestic law by later inter-
national agreements or by an act of Congress within its constitutional authority.
Their status in relation to earlier Congressional legislation has not been authori-
tatively determined." RESTATEMENT, supra, § 303 comment j. But see RESTATE-
MENT, supra, § 115 reporter's note 5.
It has been held, however, that an executive agreement made by the
President on a matter within the constitutional authority of Con-
gress, such as the regulation of commerce with foreign nations is
subject to the controlling authority of Congress and will not be
given effect in the face of an inconsistent Congressional act... The
act of a single person, even the President, cannot repeal an act of
Congress.
Id. (citations omitted).
42 This problem has been the subject of much discord between the United
States and Great Britain. Under United States law the Bermuda II air service
agreement is merely an executive agreement. Under British law the agreement is
a treaty which protects the actions British airlines take under the terms of the
treaty from United States antitrust law. See U.S. Recognizes British Position, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Nov. 5, 1984, at 27.
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The airline industry is understandably concerned about
the current inability to assure antitrust immunity. The
airlines claim that they do not want to avoid competi-
tion.48 Rather, they argue that competition laws should
be applied in ways that are consistent with the unique
characteristics of international aviation.44 The airlines ar-
gue that the application of domestic competition law is in-
consistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of many air
transport agreements; 45 that certain governments require
participation in coordinating activities;46 and that the
unique nature of the industry makes cooperation more
appropriate than competition. 47 None of these arguments
is compelling.
As discussed above, if an air service agreement has not
been approved as a treaty of the United States, United
States antitrust law supersedes the agreement. Because
the United States is aware of the relative weight of bilat-
eral agreements versus domestic law, it can be argued that
if the United States truly meant to override the antitrust
laws, the service agreements would have been enacted as
treaties. The second argument can be disposed of just as
easily. If participation in rate making and other coordi-
nating activity is truly compelled by a foreign govern-
ment, the foreign compulsion defense applies, thus
preventing antitrust liability.4 Finally, if airlines could
.3 See generally 1986 REPORT, supra note 11, at 14.
44 Id.
45 Id.
4,i Feazel, Carriers Oppose Government Efforts to Ban IATA Conference Activities, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 28, 1985, at 31.
47 1986 REPORT, supra note 11, at 14.
48 The sovereign compulsion doctrine prevents the United States from impos-
ing liability for conduct required by a foreign government. See Williams v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1982); Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298-99 (D. Del. 1970). The
foreign compulsion doctrine stems from the act of state doctrine. Under the act of
state doctrine the United States cannot hold a foreign government liable for con-
duct condemned by the United States antitrust laws. See International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The
act of state doctrine arises out of the doctrine of separation of powers among the
branches of the United States government. Id. Purely commercial conduct by a
1988] 541
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demonstrate that, in fact, cooperation is a more effective
means of achieving consumer economic welfare than com-
petition, then it is conceivable that some restraints on
trade would be found lawful.49 If, on the other hand, the
only consumer benefits the airlines could point to were
noneconomic, any resulting restraint would be unlawful.5"
In sum, it seems likely that most, if not all, of the special
circumstances that the international aviation industry
claims justify exclusion from the antitrust laws can be ade-
quately handled in the context of ordinary antitrust
doctrine.
sovereign is not exempt from United States antitrust liability, see Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 (1976), unless the purpose of the com-
mercial activity is to protect a vital interest of the foreign nation. See In re Investi-
gation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Prod., Transp., Ref. & Distrib.
of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 290-91 (D.D.C. 1952).
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982)
provides similar protection for foreign sovereigns. The Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act is distinct from the act of state doctrine. International Ass'n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers v. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d at
1359. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is jurisdictional, the act of state
doctrine is not. Id. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not apply to
cases based on a foreign government's commercial activities. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2).
While the act of state doctrine and foreign sovereign immunity apply only to
governments, a private party may make use of the related sovereign compulsion
doctrine when he has been required to commit an illegal act by a foreign sover-
eign. Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99. When the foreign sovereign merely
condones the defendant's acts, the sovereign compulsion doctrine is not available.
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962).
The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, the act of state doctrine and the sovereign
compulsion doctrines are especially important in aviation antitrust cases because
of the high degree of state ownership and regulation of airlines. For example
fourteen airlines are 100% owned by foreign governments, fourteen carriers are
over 50% owned by foreign governments, and another nine are approximately
50% controlled by foreign governments. See Cook, Counting the Dragon's Teeth: For-
eign Sovereign Immunity and Its Impact on International Aviation Litigation, 46J. AIR L. &
COM. 687, 705-06 n.86 (1981). A complete discussion of these doctrines is be-
yond the scope of this Comment.
-1, Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,587
(1988) (proposed June 8, 1988) (proposals for revisions to ANTITRUST Div., U.S.
DEP'TJUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977)). The
proposed guidelines explain that when a risk of anticompetitive effects is offset by
significant efficiency resulting in an increase in consumer welfare a restraint is not
unlawful. Id.
• See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-
96 (1978).
However, expansion of the application of United States
antitrust laws to the aviation industry could result in se-
vere international tensions. United States courts would
be required to deal with foreign airlines in the same way
that they currently deal with foreign plaintiffs and defend-
ants in other industries. As the following sections of this
comment explain, the extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law is currently severely criticized.
Application of these laws as they stand to international
aviation would likely result in even greater criticism.
II. THE APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAws IN INTERNATIONAL SETTINGS
A. The Historical Development of the Effects Test
The language of the United States antitrust laws is quite
broad. Under Section One of the Sherman Act, for in-
stance, the United States antitrust laws apply to any per-
son who "make[s] any contract or engage[s] in any
combination or conspiracy" which restrains "trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions .... -5"1 Arguably this section could be construed to
reach foreign actions which affect only foreign markets.
Federal courts have never given Section One such a broad
construction. In fact, early federal court decisions con-
strued the clause quite narrowly.
Among the earliest foreign trade cases to reach the
Supreme Court was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co. 52 In American Banana, the plaintiff alleged, among
other things, that the defendant had encouraged the
Costa Rican government to seize the plaintiff's banana
plantation. The plaintiff claimed that this action consti-
tuted a scheme to control and monopolize the banana
trade.53 The Supreme Court refused to agree that a
51 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
.12 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
53 Id. at 354. The fact situation was relatively complex. The plaintiff's prede-
cessor in interest established the banana plantation in 1903 in Panama, which at
the time was part of Colombia. The Colombian government agreed to allow
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United States court could claim jurisdiction over acts
done outside of the United States.54 Justice Holmes
noted that to hold otherwise "not only would be unjust,
but would be an interference with the authority of another
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the
other state concerned justly might resent. 55
Courts began to disregard Justice Holmes' broad state-
ments in American Banana almost immediately. Just three
years later in United States v. Pacific &Arctic Railway & Navi-
gation Co. 56 the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction
over the parties to an agreement alleged to have re-
strained a transportation route between the United States
and Canada. While the Court did not distinguish American
Banana, the Court noted that if it were to strictly apply the
rule that a court does not have jurisdiction over activities
which occur outside the borders of its country, then
neither the United States nor Canada would have jurisdic-
tion over the case, an obviously unacceptable result.57 Be-
Costa Rica to administer the territory in which the plantation was located. During
the latter part of 1903, Panama revolted and declared that the territory which
included the plantation was part of Panama. Costa Rica likewise claimed the plan-
tation, and in July of 1904 seized the plantation. Id.
.14 Id. at 357-59. Justice Holmes characterized the case as requiring a determi-
nation of the legitimacy of a foreign state's motivation in engaging in official ac-
tion, and refused to decide the case. Id. Thus, it could be argued that the
decision turned on the application of the act of state doctrine which in some in-
stances immunizes the conduct of foreign sovereigns. If that is the case, Holmes'
statements regarding general principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction are merely
dicta.
Id. at 356.
228 U.S. 87 (1913).
.7 Id. at 105-06; see also Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) (holding that
the Sherman Act applied to a rate discrimination conspiracy in shipping between
New York and South Africa because it affected U.S. commerce and was put into
operation in the United States). The Southern District of New York followed sim-
ilar reasoning in United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-Fahrt-Actien-
Gesellschaft, 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), rev'd on other grounds, 239 U.S. 466
(1916). The case involved an agreement between steamship companies regarding
the carriage of steerage passengers between the United States and Europe. The
court noted that the contract "directly and materially affected" the commerce of
the United States, and noted that it saw "nothing to warrant the contention that
the [Sherman] act should be narrowly interpreted as prohibiting only contracts
which are to be performed wholly within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States ...." Id. at 807. The court further indicated that it did not believe the
cause at least some of the illegal activity took place in the
United States, the Court was willing to find jurisdiction. 58
The first case to cite and distinguish American Banana
was United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. 59 In Sisal, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants sought to monopolize the im-
portation and sale of sisal in the United States through
actions taken in Mexico. The Court distinguished Ameri-
can Banana noting: "The United States complain of a vio-
lation of their laws within their own territory by parties
subject to their jurisdiction, not merely of something
done by another government at the instigation of private
parties.' '60
These cases established that the United States antitrust
laws extended to conduct occurring in foreign countries if
at least some of the illegal acts took place in the United
States. The question of whether the United States anti-
trust laws imposed liability for conduct occurring wholly
outside of the United States but affecting United States
commerce was, however, still open. Learned Hand an-
swered this question affirmatively in the landmark Alcoa
decision.6' In Alcoa, the government alleged that several
European aluminum companies had conspired to set quo-
tas, including quotas for the export of aluminum to the
United States. Alcoa was not a party to the agreement but
derived benefits from the agreement.62
Hand first noted that while the Constitution gave Con-
gress broad power to regulate foreign commerce, it was
not necessarily true that in enacting the Sherman Act,
Congress had exercised its full constitutional authority to
broader construction would lead to international complications, and that even if it
might, the complications were not for the court to consider. Id.
58 Pacific & Arctic Ry., 228 U.S. at 105-06.
274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927).
Id. at 276.
61 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The
Alcoa case was certified to the Second Circuit by the United States Supreme Court
because the Supreme Court could not obtain a quorum of six justices to hear the
case. Id. at 421.
62 Id. at 442.
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regulate foreign commerce. 6 1 Hand recognized, however,
that nations have the inherent authority to apply their
laws outside their borders in some cases, noting: "[I]t is
settled law .. that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its bor-
ders which the state reprehends ....
Hand identified two elements necessary to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction over parties engaged in illegal
conduct outside the United States: an effect within the
United States 65 and an intent to affect the United States. 66
Hand noted that once the plaintiff had proved an intent to
- Id. at 443. "We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom
its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United
States." Id.
'A Id. This is an aspect of the principle of territoriality. RESTATEMENT, supra note
41, § 402 comment d. According to the Restatement, international law recognizes
several bases for a country's exercise of jurisdiction including:
(l)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within
its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is in-
tended to have substantial effect within its territory; (2) the activities,
interests, status or relations of its nationals outside as well as within
its territory; and (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons
not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or
against a limited class of other state interests.
Id. § 402. The bases of jurisdiction stated in § 1 are territorial bases ofjurisdic-
tion, while the basis ofjurisdiction in § 2 is nationality. Id. at comment a. Terri-
toriality is the most common basis ofjurisdiction. Id. at comment c. An example
of territoriality in the exercise ofjurisdiction is the assertion ofjurisdiction over a
national of another jurisdiction who shoots a national of the forum state from
across the border. Id. at comment d.
1;. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. Hand explained:
Two situations are possible. There may be agreements made be-
yond our borders not intended to affect imports, which do affect
them, or which affect exports. Almost any limitation of the supply of
goods in Europe, for example, or in South America, may have reper-
cussions in the United States .... Yet when one considers the inter-
national complications likely to arise from an effort in this country to
treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress
certainly did not intend the Act to cover them.
Id.
,6 Id. at 443-44. The court explained:
Such agreements may on the other hand intend to include imports
into the United States, and yet it may appear that they have had no
effect on them . . . .[F]or argument we shall assume that the Act
does not cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports
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affect the United States, the defendant had the burden of
showing that the effect did not occur.6 7 Hand's test is
commonly known as the effects test. After Alcoa, it was
clear that as long as the effect of intentional illegal con-
duct is felt in the United States, none of the unlawful acts
incident to a violation of the United States antitrust laws
must be performed in the United States.68
Hand's test did not, however, quantify the magnitude of
the effect necessary to trigger jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. Further, Alcoa did not indicate whether a for-
eign plaintiff could claim the benefit of the United States
antitrust laws against a defendant whose illegal conduct
occurred outside the United States. Thus, after Alcoa at
least two distinct lines of cases emerged: cases which
quantified the effect on the United States necessary to as-
sert jurisdiction,69 and cases which considered whether
the United States antitrust laws were directed at activities
designed to restrainforeign markets.70 Both lines of cases
led to the expansion of the extraterritorial reach of the
United States antitrust laws.
or exports, unless its performance is shown actually to have had
some effect upon them.
Id.
67 Id. at 444. "[W]hen the parties took the trouble specifically to make the de-
pressant apply to a given market, there is reason to suppose that they expected
that it would have some effect .. ." Id.
See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1945) ("[a]greements ... for the purpose and with the effect of suppressing im-
ports into and exports from the United States, are unlawful under the Sherman
Act ...."), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F.
Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ("that the acts effectuating the conspiracy were
performed partly in Honduras does not put the conspiracy beyond reach of [the
antitrust] laws, since the agreement.., obviously was intended to, and in fact did,
affect the interstate and foreign commerce of the United States.") (citation
omitted).
69 See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases which
quantified the effect necessary for jurisdiction.
70 See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases consid-
ering whether the United States antitrust laws are designed to prevent anticompe-
tive conditions in foreign markets.
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B. The Expansion of the Effects Test
After Alcoa, courts arrived at numerous formulations of
the effects test. In one of the first cases decided using the
Alcoa test, the district court for New Jersey set forth the
requirement that the restraint must "deleteriously affect
[United States] commerce."' 7 1 In the same year the North-
ern District of Ohio described the effects test as requiring
"a direct and influencing effect" on United States com-
merce. 72 In United States v. R.P. Oldham Co. ,73 the Northern
District of California required the plaintiff to demonstrate
a "direct and substantial restraint", 4 while in Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf& Western Industries, Inc. 75 the South-
ern District of New York required merely that the effect
not be de minimus. Understandably the wide variety of
formulations made it difficult for a foreign citizen to de-
termine whether his business activities might subject him
to liability under the United States antitrust laws.76
Further difficulties arose when United States courts be-
71 United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949), modi-
fied, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
72 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio
1949), modified and aft'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
73 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
74 Id. at 822.
75 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
76 The foreign defendant is on surer ground when evaluating the likelihood that
the Justice Department will bring suit than in determining whether he will be sub-
ject to private action. The Justice Department has promulgated guidelines to in-
dicate when it will consider prosecuting antitrust violations. ANTITRUST DIv., U.S.
DEP'T JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977). The
Justice Department's enforcement policy is based on the idea that the primary
goals of United States antitrust laws are "to protect the American consuming pub-
lic by assuring it the benefit of competitive products and ideas" and "to protect
American export and investment opportunities against privately imposed restric-
tions." Id. at 4-5. With these goals in mind, the Justice Department has con-
cluded that prosecution is appropriate "when there is a substantial and foreseeable
effect on the United States commerce." Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The Justice
Department thus seeks to avoid "unnecessary interference with the sovereign in-
terests of foreign nations." Id. at 6-7.
The Justice Department recently published a revised draft of the Guide for
comment. Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584
(1988) (proposed June 8, 1988). The new guidelines express the same goals. Id.
The Justice Department proposes prosecution under the new guidelines when
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gan to extend the United States antitrust laws to protect
foreign consumers in foreign markets. Although the anti-
trust laws were designed to protect American consum-
ers, 7 7 an increasing number of foreign plaintiffs sought
access to federal courts claiming antitrust violations.
Courts were faced with the dilemma of deciding what type
of nexus must exist to justify the assertion of jurisdiction
under the United States antitrust laws.
In Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co.,78 both the plaintiff and the
defendant were citizens of the United States. The plain-
tiffs alleged that Seven-Up had entered into illegal agree-
ments with foreign bottlers to prevent Bubble Up from
entering foreign markets. 79 Thus the market affected by
the illegal agreement was a foreign market. The court re-
jected the argument that the claim lacked a jurisdictional
nexus, explaining that the plaintiffs' allegation of a sub-
stantial impact on their commerce between the United
States and foreign countries provided the requisite basis
for the claim.80
Courts also concluded that jurisdiction existed even
conduct causes a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on compe-
tition and consumers in the United States." Id. at 21,586.
In exercising its prosecutorial discretion, the Justice Department proposes
considering:
(1) The relative significance, to the violation alleged, of the conduct
within the United States to conduct abroad; (2) The nationality of
the persons involved or affected by the conduct: (3) The presence or
absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or competi-
tors; (4) The relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of
the conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) The existence of reasonable expectations that would be fur-
thered or defeated by the action; and (6) The degree of conflict with
foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies.
Id. The Justice Department seeks to avoid chilling acceptable business transac-
tions. Id. at 21,597.
77 "Congress' foremost concern in enacting the antitrust laws was the protec-
tion of American consumers and competitors." A.G.S. Elects., Ltd. v. B.S.R.
(U.S.A.), Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 707, 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 591 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir.
1978).
7o 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
79 Id. at 637.
80 "[P]laintiffs have alleged substantial impact on their United States business
and property and upon trade and commerce between the United States and for-
eign countries." Id. at 639.
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when the market affected was outside the United States
and the parties injured were not United States citizens or
corporations. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,81 the In-
dian government initiated an antitrust claim as a pur-
chaser. 2  The Supreme Court upheld the finding of
jurisdiction, holding that the requisite United States effect
existed when United States corporations monopolized a
foreign market, because otherwise the U.S. company
"might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspira-
cies affecting American consumers in the expectation that
the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would
offset any liability to plaintiffs at home." 83
Assertion of jurisdiction over cases involving foreign
plaintiffs affected in foreign markets resulted in the as-
sumption of jurisdiction over cases involving relatively
tenuous connections with the United States. However,
courts did not automatically assert jurisdiction just be-
cause a United States citizen engaged in illegal acts.
Courts required greater contacts with the United States.
For example, in Raubal v. Engelhard Minerals & Chemical
Corp. ,84 the court found the incorporation of one of the
defendants in the United States was insufficient to assert
jurisdiction. The Raubal plaintiffs, both citizens and resi-
dents of Austria, argued that two United States corpora-
tions and a Chilean corporation had monopolized the
81 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
82 Id. at 310.
83 Id. at 315; see also Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research
& Eng'g Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256 at 70,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). (fact
that injury occurred in a foreign country and was suffered by a foreign company
that does not engage in import or export to the United States is not sufficient to
deny protection of antitrust laws); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Alcoa court focused on the conse-
quences of the agreement, not the location of the responsible parties). But see
A.G.S. Elects., Ltd. v. B.S.R. (U.S.A.), Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y.)
(refusal to deal had impact only on foreign consumers and foreign exporters, thus
court had no jurisdiction), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1978); Platt Saco Lowell
Ltd. v. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,898 at
73,774 (N.D. Ill. 1977)(antitrust laws do not protect foreigners from anticompeti-
tive effects).
84 364 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Chilean copper industry. None of the defendants' copper
was sold or shipped to the United States. 5 Because none
of the copper was imported into the United States, the
court dismissed the claim.86 In contrast, inJospeh Muller
Corp. Zurich v. Societe Anonyme de Gerance et D 'Armemendt,8 a
Swiss corporation sued a French corporation claiming
both breach of contract and monopolization of the trans-
port of various chemicals.8 8 At the time of the suit, a
Franco-Swiss treaty required that any suits between
French and Swiss citizens be brought in the defendant's
country.89 The United States trial court held that despite
the treaty, it had jurisdiction. Among the items that the
court found relevant were that both the plaintiff and the
defendant had offices in the United States, that many of
the alleged acts took place in the United States, and that
the commodities involved were shipped from the United
States to other countries. 90 Thus although no United
States companies or consumers were involved, the court
found the contacts with the United States sufficient to ex-
ercise jurisdiction.9'
85 Id. at 1356-57.
6 Id. at 1357.
87 451 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
8 Id. at 728.
I d.
90 Id. at 729. The court, however, did not assert jurisdiction over the contract
claims. Id.
91 Id. But cf National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d
Cir. 1981) (actionable aspect of restraint occurred only in foreign market, result-
ing in no adverse effect on United States commerce; thus, court had no juridic-
tion); Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1981)
(court "could speculate that a restraint ... [on commodities] this country imports
or exports, or even uses, could have some effect on commerce in the United
States.... But... neither the Constitution nor the Sherman Act.. .give[s] such far
reaching power.") (emphasis in original); Conservation Council of W. Austl., Inc.
v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 518 F. Supp. 270, 276 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
("only effects alleged ... [were] effects on the regional resources and environ-
mental systems of Western Australia").
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C. Attempts to Limit the Effects Test
1. Judicial Limitations of the Effects Test
As a result of the increasing application of the United
States antitrust law to conduct which primarily affected
foreign countries, it became increasingly less clear when
United States antitrust laws would not apply. Thus while
some courts continued to expand the scope of United
States antitrust jurisdiction, others sought ways to limit it.
For example, in an attempt to avoid the uncertainty inher-
ent in the effects test, the Ninth Circuit advocated the use
of a balancing test which considered factors of comity in
deciding whether or not the federal courts should assert
jurisdiction in antitrust cases involving foreign parties.92
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. & S.A. " an
American partnership which imported lumber into the
United States from Honduras, alleged that the Bank of
America and others in the United States and Honduras
conspired to prevent Timberlane from milling lumber in
Honduras and exporting the lumber to the United States.
The defendant argued that the government of Honduras
caused the injuries Timberlane suffered.94 After rejecting
the act of state doctrine, 95 the court considered whether
American law reached the conduct Timberlane alleged.
The court first noted that foreign nations have sometimes
resented the intrusion of the United States into conduct
which the foreign governments consider within their own
authority. 96 The court stated that "at some point the in-
92 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T.& S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1977).
9- Id. at 601-05.
94 Id. at 605.
95 The court explained its rejection of the act of state doctrine: "Even if the coup
de grace to Timberlane's enterprise in Honduras was applied by official authorities
we do not agree that the doctrine necessarily shelters these defendants or requires
dismissal of the Timberlane action." Id. For a discussion of the act of state doc-
trine, see supra note 48.
M Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609. The court considered the relationship between
the United States' need to apply its laws extraterritorially and the foreign nation's
concerns:
That American law covers some conduct beyond this nation's bor-
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terests of the United States are too weak and the foreign
harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an ex-
traterritorial assertion of jurisdiction."9 7 The court con-
cluded that the effects test was incomplete because it
failed to consider other nations' interests.98 The court
then adopted a test which it deemed a "jurisdictional rule
of reason." 99
Disturbingly, the court concluded that "[t]he Sherman
Act is not limited to trade restraints which have both a
direct and substantial effect on our foreign commerce."' 00
Rather, the court called for the application of a tripartite
analysis to determine whether jurisdiction should be as-
serted.' 0 ' The first element of the tripartite test adopted
by the Ninth Circuit required that there be an actual or
intended effect on American foreign commerce.102 Sec-
ond, the effect must be "sufficiently large [as] to present a
cognizable injury to the plaintiffs . . . . -103 Finally, the
interest of the United States must be sufficiently strong
compared to foreign interests to justify the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.'0 4 The third requirement is
the heart of the Timberlane test.
The court identified nine factors that a court must
weigh in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction
ders does not mean that it embraces all, however. Extraterritorial
application is understandably a matter of concern for the other
countries involved. Those nations have sometimes resented and pro-
tested, as excessive intrusions into their own spheres, broad asser-
tions of authority by American courts.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 611-12.
-' Id. at 613. The court's jurisdictional rule of reason is predicated on the bal-
ancing of United States interests against foreign interests. Id.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 615.
102 Id. The court explained that "the antitrust laws require ... that there be
some effect - actual or intended - on American foreign commerce before the
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is appropriate. 10 5 Several of the factors relate to the con-
tacts of the parties with the United States and are actually
nothing more than an elaboration of the effects test.10 6
However, other items are controversial. For instance, the
test requires that the court weigh the degree of conflict
between the foreign law or policy and the United States
policy, with the assumption that each nation's policy is le-
gitimate.1 0 7 The court must determine the relative impor-
tance of the policies in question to each state. 08
The Third Circuit adopted a similar approach in Man-
nington Mills v. Congoleum Corp. 109 In Mannington Mills, the
plaintiff alleged that Congoleum obtained patents by
fraud in foreign countries and that Congoleum enforced
the fraudulently obtained patents by threatening to bring
suit in those countries. This practice allegedly restrained
trade by restricting the ability of American competitors to
use Congoleum's unpatentable designs. 1 0 The Third
Circuit first noted that it had jurisdiction over acts which
occur outside the United States if they "adversely and ma-
terially affect American trade . . . ."I" The court found
105 The court listed the following factors:
the degree of conflict with foreign law of policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of busi-
ness of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative impor-
tance of the violations charged of conduct within the United States
as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
1m; For instance the nationality of the parties, the location of the principal place
of business of a corporation, the extent of a purpose to affect American commerce
and the foreseeability of the effect would be all relevant under the Alcoa effects
test. For a discussion of the relationship between nationality, purpose and effect,
see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
107 See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614-15 n.34.
-- Id. at 615 n.34. At least one federal court has indicated that the federal
courts cannot and should not weigh essentially political factors. Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See infra
notes 156-172 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Laker.
595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291. The Mannington Mills court noted: "[T]he Supreme Court has
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that exclusion of an American firm from competition in a
foreign country adversely affects United States interests;
thus, the court had jurisdiction to hear the case.'" 2 The
court concluded, however, that the inquiry should not
stop there when foreign nations are involved." 3 The
court set out to determine whether it was appropriate to
exercise its jurisdiction, based on considerations of com-
ity and foreign policy. The court set forth ten considera-
tions which it concluded should be balanced to decide
whether or not to assert jurisdiction." 4 The dissent re-
jected the majority's comity approach and argued that the
court could not choose to abstain if it had jurisdiction. 1 5
made it clear that 'foreign commerce' applies to importing, exporting and other
commercial transactions, as well as transportation and communication between the
United States and a foreign country." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 1296. The Timberlane court's approach and the Mannington Mills court's
approaches are analytically distinct. In Timberlane the comity test was part of the
analysis required to determine if the court had jurisdiction. In Mannington Mills
the comity test was used to determine whether the court should exercise its juris-
diction. The Mannington Mills approach was used by the Seventh Circuit in In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). The three factors that
the Uranium Antitrust court concluded justified the exercise ofjurisdiction were the
complexity of the case, the seriousness of the charges, and the attitude of the
defaulting plaintiffs toward the litigation. 617 F.2d at 1255.
"1 The court explained that if a United States firm were "excluded from com-
petition... by fraudulent conduct... [iun a purely domestic situation, the right to
a remedy would be clear." Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1296.
11 The Mannington Mills factors are even more politically oriented than the
Timberlane factors. The ten factors are:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; 2. Nationality of
the parties; 3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of con-
duct here compared to that abroad; 4. Availability of a remedy
abroad and the pendency of litigation there; 5. Existence of intent to
harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability; 6. Possible
effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief; 7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in
the position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either coun-
try or be under conflicting requirements by both countries; 8.
Whether the court can make its order effective; 9. Whether an order
for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances; 10. Whether a treaty with the
affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98 (footnote omitted).
" The dissent argued that absent an accepted abstention doctrine, a court may
not decline to exercise its jurisdiction. According to the dissent, because interna-
tional comity is not an abstention doctrine, if the court determined it had jurisdic-
tion it could not dismiss the case. Id. at 1301-02 n.9; see also Industrial Inv. Dev.
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The dissent further pointed out that even if abstention
were legitimate, comity would be a significant considera-
tion only when the foreign law required conduct inconsis-
tent with the conduct required by the Sherman Act." t6
2. Congressional Limitations of the Effects Test
In an attempt to limit the reach of the antitrust laws and
to clarify the jurisdictional standard, Congress enacted
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982. I t7 The Act had two effects: the limitation of the
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) (questioning
whether the trial court may exercise discretion in choosing not to apply the anti-
trust laws), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). For a further discussion
of the validity of international comity as a basis for dismissal, see infra notes 134-
174 and accompanying text.
11, Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1302. The dissent seemed worried that be-
cause the foreign country's policy was different, a federal court might dismiss on
the basis of comity. There is clearly a distinction between inconsistent policies
and merely different policies. If policies conflict, a defendant cannot comply with
both the foreign requirement and the United States requirement. On the other
hand, if the policies are merely different, he could comply with both. There seems
to be some grounds for the dissent's concern. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am. N.T.& S.A., 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984)(appeal of district court's
application of comity analysis on remand). The appellate court concluded that
although the district court had reached the correct conclusion, it had applied the
test incorrectly. Timberlane II, 749 F.2d at 1383. The Ninth Circuit noted that
Honduran law allowed competitors to allocate territories, fix prices and limit out-
put. United States law prohibits these practices. The Ninth Circuit noted that in
some cases this type of conflict alone would be sufficient to allow a court to de-
cline jurisdiction. Id. at 1384. However, Honduran law did not actually require
conduct forbidden by the United States. Thus there is no possibility that the de-
fendant could be found to have violated Honduran laws by complying with United
States laws.
- Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290,
Title IV, §§ 401-403, 96 Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)). In rele-
vant part the statute reads:
[T]his Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or import com-
merce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign
nations unless - (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect - (A) on trade or commerce which is not
trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or im-
port commerce with foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or ex-
port commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such
trade or commerce in the United States; .. .If this Act applies ...
only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then ... this Act
shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the
United States.
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ability of plaintiffs to redress anticompetitive practices oc-
curring outside of the United States through the United
States judicial system, and the immunization of United
States exporters from liability for antitrust violations af-
fecting only foreign consumers and competitors." 8 Con-
gress indicated that foreign citizens should be protected
by United States antitrust laws when they participate in
the United States markets." 9 However, when effects do
not occur in the United States, Congress believed that jus-
tice is best served by requiring the plaintiff to seek redress
in his home country. 21
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act also
clarified the standard to be applied in evaluating when an
effect on the United States is sufficient to warrant federal
jurisdiction. The Act provides that the Sherman Act does
not "apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign na-
tions unless - (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States com-
merce or on the business of a person engaged in export-
ing from the United States to foreign nations.' 2' Two
aspects of the statute are noteworthy. First, the "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" standard does
not apply to anticompetitive acts which affect imports. 22
Presumably if a foreign defendant is accused of restricting
Id.
1,8 See H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2487 [hereinafter COMMITrEE REPORT]. For cases illustrat-
ing these effects, see infra note 125.
119 Id. at 10, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2495. "Foreign purchas-
ers should enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the domestic marketplace,
just as our citizens do." Id.
120 Id.
121 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
122 The introductory clause indicates that § 6a does not cover import trade or
commerce. Id. It is unclear whether anticompetitive acts directed at international
flights entering the United States would be subject to the direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect standard. It could be argued that air traffic entering
the United States is in the nature of an import and thus the plaintiff need only
show an effect rather than a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect to
survive the jurisdictional challenge.
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the imports of the United States, the effect required for
application of the antitrust laws is less substantial. 23 Sec-
ond, the statute eliminates the requirement of intent to
harm the United States.1 24 Even an unintended effect will
give rise to liability so long as the effect is foreseeable.
Cases decided under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1982 bear out the theory that the Act
made access to the federal courts for antitrust violations
abroad more difficult.' 25 The Southern District of New
York explained the Act in Eurim-Pharm GMbH v. Pfizer,
Inc. :126
The amendment clearly was intended to exempt from
United States antitrust law conduct that lacks the requisite
domestic effect, even where such conduct originates in the
,2 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,595
(1988) (proposed June 8, 1988).
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). Congress indicated that the reasonably foresee-
able standard is the substitute for an intent requirement. Congress chose to re-
quire reasonable foreseeability rather than intent because Congress wanted "to
make the standard an objective one and to avoid-at least at the jurisdictional
stage-inquiries into the actual, subjective motives of defendants." COMMITrEE RE-
PORT, supra note 118, at 9, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2494. The
Committee noted that "[a]n intent test might encourage ignorance of the conse-
quences of one's actions, which in this context, would be an undesirable result."
Id.
I2 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986) (plaintiff was unable to recover antitrust damages based solely on carteliza-
tion of Japanese market); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 813-15
(9th Cir. 1988) (antitrust claim concerning refusal to deal in foreign trade not
within court's subject matter jurisdiction); 'In' Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987)(foreign company that demonstrated an
effect on United States export trade but that was not a United States exporter
itself lacked jurisdictional basis for claim); Papst Motoren GMbH & Co. v.
Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.), Inc., 629 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (effects of al-
legedly illegal act occurred only in Japan; thus court lacked jurisdiction); Liamuiga
Tours v. Travel Impressions Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (although
some allegedly illegal conduct was committed in the United States by a United
States corporation, court lacked jurisdiction because effects of conduct were felt
only in St. Kitts); Power E., Ltd. v. Transamerica Deleval Inc., 558 F. Supp. 47
(S.D.N.Y.) (although plaintiff's principal shareholder was a United States citizen
and defendant was a United States corporation, court did not have jurisdiction
because plaintiff was excluded from a market outside the United States), aff'd, 742
F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1983).
,26 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
United States or involves American-owned entities operat-
ing abroad.
Section 7 does not, however, preclude all persons or en-
tities injured abroad from recovering under United States
antitrust laws. When the activity complained of has a de-
monstrable effect on United States domestic or import
commerce, foreign corporations injured abroad may seek
recovery under the Sherman Act.' 2 7
The Eurim-Pharm court found it lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the plaintiff could not show any link between Pfi-
zer's allegedly illegal conduct in Europe and United
States commerce. 128
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 limited the class of foreign plaintiffs who have access
to the United States courts and limited the extent of anti-
trust liability for American businesses operating
abroad.'29 Thus the Act is in no way responsive to foreign
governments' concerns that the United States antitrust
laws are overly broad. If anything, the Act makes the ex-
traterritorial application of United States antitrust laws
seem even more unfair because as far as United States im-
ports go, a court would have jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant whose activities did not give rise to "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects on the
United States."
Further, the Act does not in any way mention consider-
ation of comity as an element of the jurisdictional deci-
sion.' 3 0 The legislative history of the Act indicates that
courts would be able to "employ notions of comity, or
127 Id. at 1106 (footnote omitted).
128 Id.
,29 See supra note 125 and accompanying text for examples of recent cases in
which the United States refused to assert jurisdiction.
,so See Murphy, Moderating Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Foreign Trade An-
titrust Improvements Act and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised), 54 U.
GIN. L. REv. 779, 813 (1986). The Murphy article discusses the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 extensively in comparison to the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations (Revised). Since the date of Murphy's article the Re-
statement has been revised further resulting in the publication the Restatement
(Third). See infra notes 175-184 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Third Restatement's antitrust provisions.
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otherwise to take account of the international character of
the transaction. ''3 Congress' failure to explicitly require
balancing of United States interests against foreign inter-
ests tends to indicate that Congress did not consider the
comity analysis essential in every case. 32
III. RECENT CRITICISMS OF THE COMITY ANALYSIS
A. Commentators' Criticisms
While the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
clarified the jurisdictional standard for cases involving
plaintiffs affected in foreign markets, the general body of
extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction law still applies in a
great number of cases. The comity analysis of Timberlane
is thus not dead, although some commentators urge that
it should be.' 33  One interesting argument is that
Timberlane requires unauthorized judicial abstention. 34
The Supreme Court has indicated that absent a recog-
nized ground for abstention, a federal court may not de-
cline to exercise its jurisdiction. 35 Each of the currently
recognized abstention doctrines is based on the relation-
'!" COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 118, at 13, 1982 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2498 (citation omitted).
132 Murphy, supra note 130, at 813.
'3 Interestingly, although the Justice Department will consider comity in decid-
ing whether to prosecute a criminal antitrust action, see supra note 76, the Justice
Department believes judicial dismissal on the basis of comity factors is inappropri-
ate in criminal actions. Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed.
Reg. 21,595 n.l 12 (1988). Further, the Justice Department believes that even
where the judiciary is justified in conducting a comity analysis, the effect of anti-
trust suits on foreign relations cannot be considered. To do so infringes upon the
exectuive branch's function. Id. at 21,596 n. 115. For a discussion of the political
question implications of comity analysis, see infra notes 142-144 and accompany-
ing text.
134 See, e.g., Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1301-02 n.9 (dissent); Industrial Inv.
Dev. Corp., 671 F.2d 884-85 n.7; Sennett & Gavil, Antitrust Jurisdiction, Extraterritorial
Conduct and Interest-Balancing, 19 INrr'L LAw. 1185, 1210 (1985) ; Rahl, International
Application of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
336, 363 (1980).
l3 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). In the Cohens
case, ChiefJustice Marshall stated: "We have no more right to decline the exercise
ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution." Id.
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ship of the federal government to the individual states.13 6
Situations involving foreign governments obviously do
not raise the same concerns of federalism. Moreover,
traditonal abstention doctrines do not deprive a plaintiff
of a vested cause of action.137 For both of these reasons,
comity-based abstention would seem improper.
One response to this criticism has been to suggest that
the requirement of an effect on foreign commerce is not a
jurisdictional requirement at all. 1 3  According to this
view, federal courts are authorized to hear antitrust cases
under 28 U.S.C. § 1337,' s9 whether or not the claimed an-
titrust violation affects the United States. The require-
ment that the plaintiff demonstrate an effect on United
States commerce is a substantive element of the claim ac-
cording to this view.140 In that case, if a court decides to
dismiss a case based on considerations of comity, it is be-
cause the plaintiff had failed to state a claim; thus, no
question of abstention arises.
This response may be appealing because it legitimizes
consideration of foreign interests in deciding whether a
case should proceed. However, this approach raises simi-
lar concerns. It is doubtful that Congress could give fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over antitrust claims that did not
'16 C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (4th ed. 1982). The four
recognized bases are: (1) to avoid decision of constitutional questions when state
law can decide the case; (2) to prevent conflict between the state and federal gov-
ernment in the decision of state matters; (3) to allow the states to resolve unset-
tled issues in their own law; and (4) to prevent duplication of effort between state
and federal courts. Id.
,37 P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 113-14. As a rule, alternative relief must be
available to justify abstention. Id. at 113. A plaintiff in an antitrust action often
will not have foreign remedies available because many foreign countries do not
prohibit anticompetitive conduct. Id. Thus abstention in antitrust actions raises
due process concerns. Id. at 113 n.175.
-s' P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES & THEIR APPLICATION $ 237 (Supp. 1986); see Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1171-72 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
-, 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). This section provides in part: "The district
court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising
under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and com-
merce against restraints and monopolies ... Id.
.... P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 138, at 237.
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have at least a de minimis effect on the United States.1 4 '
Federal courts would be required to find at least a de
minimis effect on the United States to assert jurisdiction.
The question of the validity of abstention would thus arise
once more.
A further criticism of comity analysis is that courts must
consider questions of foreign relations usually left to the
Department of State and other arms of the executive
branch. 42 Under the political question doctrine, issues
committed to coordinate branches of government are
non-justiciable. 43 If we accept the view that comity is an
essential consideration in cases involving foreign parties,
antitrust cases could be found to raise political questions
because they require a judicial determination of the
weight to be accorded to foreign interests. 44
The final theoretical problem with comity analysis is
that, as a rule, it deprives a plaintiff of any possibility of
obtaining relief. Comity analysis adopts a choice of law
approach to decide whether to assert jurisdiction. 4 5 How-
ever, choice of law analysis is not a vehicle to decide
whether to hear a case. Rather, as its name implies,
choice of law analysis is used to determine whether the
law of the forum or some otherjurisdiction will control. 146
A true choice of law analysis, it is true, might sometimes
end in the decision that United States law does not apply.
The result, however, would not be dismissal. Instead, the
law of some other jurisdiction would apply.
Requiring courts to consider questions of comity also
,"' The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. Arguably if there
is no effect on the United States, Congress is not regulating commerce with for-
eign nations but rather among foreign nations.
,4' 1 W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.15 (3d ed.
1982).
14. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). For a discussion of the political
question implications of comity based dismissal, see Sennett & Cavil, supra note
134, at 1210.
,4- See Sennett & Gavil, supra note 134, at 1210-11.
145 P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 111.
.#.; Id. at 121.
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raises practical problems. Among those most frequently
cited is the difficulty of weighing the interests of foreign
nations.'4 7 The court must operate within the constraints
of the adversary system. One of the problems with trying
to weigh the interests of a non-party foreign government
is that the views of the government will be presented by
the party attempting to avoid jurisdiction.1 48 Thus, it is
likely that some foreign interests will be given more im-
portance than the foreign government itself would accord
the policy at issue.
The judicial context is not the best context in which to
make foreign policy decisions.1 49 Even executive agencies
with much greater resources at hand often find it difficult
to accurately weigh foreign interests. Given that the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction determination will generally occur
early in the proceedings and that the information upon
which the court could base its evaluation of the interests
of the foreign government will be limited, it is unlikely
that foreign interests could be sufficiently protected.
Further, it is not at all clear that a comity analysis is nec-
essary. The Timberlane test would allow United States
courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims involving for-
eign parties, even if there was no substantial impact on
the United States, as long as no other nation's interests
were adversely affected.1 50 But the question arises
whether Congress intended the antitrust laws to remedy
such situations. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine a sit-
uation involving substantial harm to United States com-
merce in which a United States court would be willing to
conclude that United States interests were outweighed by
147 Rahl, supra note 134, at 363. The ability of United States courts to weigh the
interests of foreign nations was one of the Laker court's primary concerns. Laker,
731 F.2d at 948-53.
141 Sennett & Gavil, supra note 134, at 1211. Sennett & Gavil note that the
United States and the foreign government involved might be asked to appear, but
that problems could develop if one or both parties did not appear Id.
1" P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 119 (comity approach "reduces extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction to a question of politics ... a task which the courts are
ill suited to perform").
i- Id.
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a foreign country's interest in allowing the practice to
continue.
Finally, other factors tend to diminish the importance
of the comity analysis.15 1 First, unless a foreign defendant
has significant contacts with the United States, a court will
be unable to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant.152 If, for example, airlines which do not fly into the
United States or have any other operations in the United
States conspire to restrain routes entirely outside the
United States, it is unlikely that a United States court
would have personal jurisdiction. Second, air service
treaties could be negotiated to prevent the application of
the United States antitrust laws.' 53 Third, in recent years
the European Economic Community and Germany have
expanded the extraterritorial application of their antitrust
laws.' 54 Thus, it is likely that the practice of asserting ex-
traterritorial antitrust jurisdiction will become less unu-
sual in the international community. 155
'-' P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 138, at 232.1. Areeda and
Hovenkamp characterize the entire process as a "molehill inflated into a moun-
tain." Id. at 232.1e.
1-52 Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, -18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199, 225 (1977). For a thorough discussion of
personal jurisdiction, venue and service of process concepts as they are likely to
apply to international aviation antitrust cases, see P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 70-
88. Barlow concludes that if an airline maintains an agent in the United States
personal jurisdiction is almost inevitable. Id. at 88. Recent cases, however, sug-
gest that foreign parties may be entitled to special deference in assessing the fair-
ness of personal jurisdiction. Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct.
1026 (1987) (plurality opinion) (court should carefully inquire into reasonable-
ness ofjurisdiction where a foreign defendant is involved); Helicopteros Nacion-
ales de Colombia, S.A v. Hall, 460 U.S. 408 (1984) (to establish personal
jurisdiction in suits that do not arise out of contacts with the United States, actitiv-
ity in United States must be contiuous and systematic).
'- Kintner & Griffin, supra note 152, at 225-26.
1 Id. at 225. For an analysis of the extraterritorial application of Germany's
antitrust laws, see Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws,
77 Am. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983) (arguing that Germany has avoided international
conflict by limiting jurisdiction to those cases having substantial and direct effects
in Germany).
' The fact that other governments exercise broad extraterritorial jurisdiction
may not stiffle foreign outcry against extraterritorial application of United States
antitrust laws. The British reaction in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) could recur. See infra notes 156-
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B. Judicial Decisions Criticizing Comity
At least one federal court has reacted to criticism of
comity analysis by abandoning comity as a considera-
tion. 5 6 The Laker litigation caused considerable tension
between the United States and Great Britain in the execu-
tive and judicial branches of both countries. 57 Laker al-
leged that a number of international air carriers conspired
to drive him out of business by engaging in predatory
pricing on flights to and from the United States. Laker
instituted an antitrust action in the United States federal
court based on these alleged violations. 58 The foreign
defendants obtained an injunction in Britain, preventing
Laker from proceeding with his actions against them.'5 9
Laker then filed a second suit against KLM and Sabena
Belgian World Airways. The district court granted a pre-
liminary injunction preventing KLM, Sabena, and the U.S.
defendants from invoking the jurisdiction of foreign
courts to prevent the adjudication of the dispute in the
United States. 60 The British court subsequently dis-
solved its antisuit injunction in the first action because it
concluded that application of the United States antitrust
laws did not violate British sovereignty.' 6' The British
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, however, con-
cluded that the action threatened British trading interests,
and prohibited entities carrying on business in the United
172 for a discussion of Laker. However, foreign governments will no longer be
able to assert that the United States is unique in its imposition upon foreign
defendants.
15.. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). For an excellent discussion of the Laker litigation see Rogers, Still
Running Against the Wind: A Comment on Antitrust Jurisdiction and Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 931 (1985).
157 See articles cited supra note 13 for contemporaneous reports of the
problems.
-m Laker, 731 F.2d at 917. The defendants in the action were Pan American
World Airways, Trans World Airlines, McDonnell Douglas, McDonnell Douglas
Finance, British Airways, British Caledonian, Lufthansa, and Swissair. Id.
,: Id. at 918.
'' Id. at 918-19. The injunction was necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of
the district court. Id. at 929-30.
1,; Id. at 919.
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Kingdom from cooperating with any orders arising out of
Laker's antitrust action in the United States. 162 The Brit-
ish Court of Appeal upheld the order and enjoined Laker
from taking any further action against British airlines in
the United States antitrust litigation. 63 KLM and Sabena
then appealed the United States district court's injunc-
tion, claiming that it prevented them from exercising their
right of access to foreign courts. 64
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's
antisuit injunction. In upholding the injunction, the D.C.
Circuit discussed the extraterritorial application of the an-
titrust laws at length. The court concluded that the juris-
diction of the United States was clear under the facts of
the Laker cases. 65 The court noted that the greatest im-
pact of predatory pricing on international routes between
Europe and the United States would be on American con-
sumers. 166 The court further found that the actions of the
conspirators destroyed Laker's ability to pay his American
creditors. 67 The court finally noted that landing rights
served as permits to do business, and that by accepting
the landing rights the foreign airlines subjected them-
selves to United States antitrust law. 16 8
6M Id. at 920. The determination was made and the order was entered under
the authority of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. Id. The
Protection of Trading Interests Act is a blocking statute which contains discovery
limiting provisions and clawback provisions. See supra notes 14-15.
,3 Laker, 731 F.2d at 920.
161 Id. at 921.
,,' Id. at 953.
66 Id. at 923-24. The court noted: "The greatest impact of a predatory pricing
conspiracy would be to raise fares for United States passengers. No other single
nation has nearly the same interest in consumer protection on the particular com-
bination of routes involved in Laker's antitrust claims." Id. at 924.
167 Id. at 924. The court concluded that the creditor's claims were an even more
direct United States interest than the consumer interests that Laker's action would
protect. Id. at 924-25.
6- Id. at 924-25. The court explained: "The landing rights granted to appel-
lants are permits to do business in this country. Foreign airlines fly in the United
States on the prerequisite of obeying United States law." Id. (citation omitted).
The court further noted that the purpose of regulation was to place foreign air-
lines on equal footing with United States airlines; otherwise, United States airlines
would be at a competitive disadvantage because United States citizens could en-
force laws against United States carriers but not foreign carriers. Id. at 925. Fi-
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The court rejected the argument that considerations of
comity dictated that the court should not exercise jurisdic-
tion. The court noted that federal courts should not be
asked to conduct an interest balancing inquiry because
courts are unqualified to balance factors which are essen-
tially political considerations.' 69 The court urged that the
executive and legislative branches resolve the basic issues
which led to conflicting assertions of jurisdiction. 7 0 The
court concluded that even if judges were competent to
balance the delicate political issues raised by conflicting
assertions of jurisdiction, courts probably could not re-
main neutral toward both the United States' policy and
the foreign country's policy.' 7' The court finally pointed
out that the Sherman Act is mandatory United States law
and that the judiciary cannot abandon its jurisdiction
when applying mandatory law.' 72
The Laker litigation clearly demonstrates the problems
of applying United States antitrust laws to aviation. By
definition, a foreign nation will have a significant interest
in any case involving international aviation. Although the
United States views competition as the preferred form of
economic conduct, many nations do not believe free com-
petition is desirable in aviation.
Of course, in some cases United States courts probably
do not have jurisdiction. For example, if a group of for-
eign carriers combined to exclude an American carrier
from an entirely foreign market, a United States court
probably should not hear the case. While it could be ar-
nally, the court noted that the foreign airlines enjoyed the protection of the
United States antitrust laws and that therefore they should be subject to them. Id.
,, Id. at 948. The court concluded that the conflict was not caused by the au-
thority of the courts in the two countries but rather by the different national poli-
cies toward anticompetitive actitivies. Id. at 945. Thus the court concluded that
the courts of each nation could not accommodate the policy of the other country
and remain faithful to the laws of its own country. Id. at 948.
171 Id. at 955.
171 Id. at 951. "When push comes to shove, the domestic forum is rarely un-
seated . . . . [C]ourts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing
foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be fa-
vored over foreign interests." Id. (footnotes omitted).
172 Id. at 953-54.
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gued that United States consumers and competitors who
transacted business in such a market might be injured,
surely the United States antitrust laws were not intended
to force American economic beliefs on the world.
When the United States has a legitimate interest in pro-
moting its economic values, Timberlane breaks down. As-
sume, for example, that as part of a plan to increase
tourism by Americans, a foreign government encourages,
but does not require, private carriers incorporated in that
country to engage in cooperative below cost price setting
for routes between that country and the United States. 7"
Both the United States and the foreign nation would have
significant interests in such a situation. United States
courts should not be required to hold American economic
aims subservient to foreign economic aims merely be-
cause the foreign country does not accept American eco-
nomic values. Timberlane and its progeny give critical
weight to the degree of conflict between United States
and foreign policies. In doing so they tend to undervalue
American policy. 74
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CoMITY ANALYSIS
A. Restatement of Foreign Relations (Third) Approach
The Restatement of Foreign Relations (Third) devotes
a section specifically to the application of the United
States antitrust laws.' 75 The Restatement divides antitrust
17 Foreign sovereign immunity would not apply in this situation because the
government does not own the airlines in this hypothetical. The sovereign com-
pulsion doctrine also would not apply because the government does not require
participation. For a discussion of foreign sovereign immunity and the sovereign
compulsion doctrine see supra note 48.
174 See P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 127-28:
In the context of international air transportation .... many of [the
comity] factors are inappropriate to the determination of whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists. In the final analysis, the outcome
would depend on a subjective assessment by either the court, or the
court acting upon executive advice, of political and possibly aviation
rather than antitrust considerations.
Id.
75 RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 415. The Restatement provides:
[54
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violations into three categories. 7 6 The first category con-
sists of cases in which acts restraining trade are carried
out in the United States. According to the Restatement,
the United States has jurisdiction in these cases regardless
of the parties' nationality or place of business. 77 Under
the Restatement, the United States can proscribe conduct
which has no effect whatsoever in the United States as
long as some of the conduct necessary to carry out the
restraint occurs in the United States. Such an assertion of
United States jurisdiction does not seem appropriate in
light of the fact that the Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 indicates a clear Congressional intent to extend the
protection of the antitrust laws primarily to United States
consumers and competitors. 78  Federal courts could be
required to hear numerous foreign claims to decide
whether a substantial amount of the conduct in restraint
of trade had occurred in the United States. This provision
would strain judicial resources.
The second category of cases under the Restatement
are those that involve acts in restraint of trade occurring
outside the United States, which are intended to interfere
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made in
the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such
trade that is carried out in significant measure in the United States,
are subject to the jurisdiction to proscribe of the United States, re-
gardless of the nationality or place of business of the parties to the
agreement or of the participants in the conduct. (2) Any agreement
in restraint of United States trade that is made outside of the United
States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that
is carried out predominantly outside of the United States, are sub-
ject to the jurisdiction to proscribe of the United States, if a principal
purpose of the conduct or agreement is to interfere with the com-
merce of United States, and the agreement or conduct has some ef-
fect on that commerce. (3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint
of United States trade are subject to the jurisdiction to proscribe of
the United States if such agreements or conduct have substantial ef-
fect on the commerce of the United States and the exercise of juris-




178 See supra notes 117-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pur-
pose of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.
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with United States commerce, and which have some effect
on United States commerce.' 79 This section essentially
parallels the Alcoa effects test. It is subject to the same
problem that the Alcoa test is subject to: it allows assertion
of jurisdiction on the basis of a de minimis effect on
United States commerce.18 0 Clearly such an exercise ofju-
risdiction based on a de minimis effect would be too
broad, not just because the interests of the foreign na-
tions involved would presumably be greater than the
United States interests, but also because in most cases any
small effect on the United States markets would be
indirect.
The final category under the Restatement involves
other conduct which has substantial effects on United
States commerce. 8 ' This category thus includes conduct
not intended to affect the United States but which does
affect the United States, and conduct which is intended to
affect the United States but which does not succeed. The
Restatement would allow exercise of jurisdiction only if it
were reasonable for the United States to exercise jurisdic-
tion. 8 2 The Restatement sets out the elements which are
to be considered in deciding whether jurisdiction is rea-
,79 RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 415(2). For text, see supra note 175.
18o See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
problems that arose as a result of the expansion of the effects test.
1, RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 415(3). For text, see supra note 175.
182 RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 415(3). The Restatement lists a number of
factors which must be evaluated in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction in
these cases. These factors include:
(a) the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the terri-
tory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally re-
sponsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character
of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activi-
ties, and the degree to which the desirability of such regualation is
generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that
might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of
the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic sys-
tem; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tra-
ditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another
sonable in Section 403.83 The basic problem with these
considerations is that they parallel the Timberlane consid-
erations. Thus they are subject to the same procedural,
constitutional, and practical limitations as other types of
comity analysis. 84
B. Accommodation of the Substantive Law to Foreign Parties
At least part of the reason that foreign governments do
not approve of United States antitrust law is that it in-
volves concepts unknown to their judicial systems. Two.
frequently cited examples are per se liability and treble
damages. Some problems could be alleviated by the
adoption of different substantive rules for extraterritorial
cases.' 85 For example, it might be appropriate to elimi-
nate per se condemnation of restraints occurring in for-
eign commerce. 86 This would enable courts to consider
market conditions in the relevant foreign country which
might make the restraint in issue reasonable, while al-
lowing them to condemn those restraints that served no
purpose other than the elimination of competition. 187
state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the like-
lihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
183 Id.
184 See supra notes 134-172 for a discussion of the flaws of the Timberlane comity
analysis. Several commentators have suggested approaches that in some way in-
volve interest balancing. See, e.g., Grossfeld & Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to
Jurisdictional Conflicts in International Economic Law, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 931
(1983) (suggesting extraterritorial application of laws based on shared values);
Ongman, "Be No Longer A Chaos ": Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's
Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 733 (1977) (suggesting a three
stage analysis ultimately focusing on "accommodation of multistate interstate
interests").
185 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33, at 237.
186 Id. TheJustice Department, for instance, in the past advocated a broader use
of the rule of reason in the international context. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977). The revised
draft of the Guide omits this suggestion.
187 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 33, at 237. Areeda & Turner note:
"To say that domestic per se rules are not necessarily and automatically applicable
in the international context is not to say that an antitrust court needs to hesitate
very long before condemning restraints... without any plausible purpose other
than the suppression of competition with and in the United States." Id.
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This suggestion has some merit. The rationale for per
se rules in antitrust analysis is that courts have sufficient
experience with certain restraints to decide immediately
that the conduct involved is anticompetitive. 8 8 However,
in the foreign context, courts may be unfamiliar with mar-
ket conditions that require the parties to engage in con-
duct generally considered anticompetitive. Rejection of
conventional assumptions, however, does not solve the
basic problem. A court might conclude that it had juris-
diction in a case which affected United States trade or
commerce only incidentally, examine all the factors as-
serted to justify the restraint, and find the restraint unrea-
sonable. Surely the foreign governments involved would
object in such a case, despite the fact that the per se rule
had not been applied.
C. Pending Legislation
Given the chaotic and uncertain state of the law, the
most efficient means of deciding whether the jurisdiction
of the federal courts reaches foreign parties would be to
amend the antitrust laws. One such amendment is cur-
rently pending in Congress.' 89 The bill provides that fed-
eral courts must hear motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction before other proceedings are
conducted. 9 0 The purpose of the provision is to prevent
exhaustive pretrial discovery only to find that the court
lacks jurisdiction. 191 While early rulings on subject matter
jurisdiction may -be practical in some cases, early rulings
188 H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS & FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 126-27 (1985).
189 S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S2292 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1987).
,oo Id. The bill provides:
Whenever a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under this section is made, the court shall, except for good cause
shown, hear and determine such motion, after such discovery or
other proceedings directly related to the motion, as the court deems
appropriate, before conducting or permitting the parties to conduct
any furhter [sic] proceedings in the action.
Id. at S2293.
,9' Id. at S2296.
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will often be impractical. In the international aviation set-
ting for example, restraints of trade are likely to involve a
number of routes and carriers. To decide whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction, the court must necessarily ex-
amine the merits to some degree to determine who was
harmed, when and under what circumstances. 9 2 In such
cases it might be more practical to hear all the evidence at
one time rather than engaging in duplicate hearings.
The bill would also require the court to balance a
number of factors in determining whether the court has
subject matter jurisdiction.'93 Among these factors are
the significance of the conduct within the United States
and abroad, the nationality of the plaintiffs and defend-
ants, the presence of a purpose to affect the United States,
the significance and foreseeability of the effects within the
United States and abroad, the existence of reasonable ex-
pectations that would be affected by the action, and the
degree of conflict with foreign laws or economic poli-
cies. 194 The bill also provides rather cryptically, "nothing
in this section shall be construed to authorize the court to
consider the effect on foreign political relations of the
United States of any action sought to be dismissed."'' 95
Based on the political nature of the factors listed, how-
ever, it would seem difficult, if not impossible, for the
court to avoid considering the foreign relations impact of
the case.
V. CONCLUSION
It would seem that the best way to avoid judicial foreign
policy making would be to eliminate all considerations of
the political impact of antitrust jurisdiction. Courts
should focus instead on whether the conduct alleged had
192 See P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 93 n.28 (suggesting that "the effects doctrine
results in subject matter jurisdiction addressing issues directed to the merits of
the case.").
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a substantial and direct effect on United States consumers
or competitors. Where the effect is insubstantial or indi-
rect the United States should not claim jurisdiction re-
gardless of whether the conduct affects imports or
exports.
Enactment of such legislation would give the courts a
starting point to determine the degree to which Congress
sought to apply the antitrust laws. The Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 has been a step in
the right direction because it definitively indicates that
Congress does not think the antitrust laws should be con-
strued to protect foreign consumers or competitors.
Any statute enacted should avoid the inclusion of sub-
jective political evaluations in any way.19 6 Rather, the leg-
islation should focus on the economic impact of the trade
restraint. The key to asserting jurisdiction should be that
the conduct substantially, directly, and actually injured
United States commerce. Factors which may indicate such
an effect are the nationality of the parties, the location of
performance of the illegal acts, the locations of the users
of the restrained goods and services, and the location of
the competitors in the restrained goods or services. 197
The greater the number of these factors that point to the
United States, the more appropriate the exercise of juris-
diction. 198 Each of these factors could be determined ob-
jectively; thus, it is likely that greater uniformity of
decision would result.
It might seem that eliminating considerations of foreign
policy and the political aspects of the antitrust laws will
,m! For a discussion of the problems courts face in attempting to apply political
tests see supra notes 133-154.
,17 Cf Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (United States has employment, financial and national defense interest in
jurisdiction over international transportation); Dominicus Americana Bohio v.
Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing origin of
commerce, nationality of plaintiffs and defendants, location of users of services,
and location of performance of anticompetitive acts as relevant factors).
' Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 403 reporter's note 4. The reporter's note
indicates that the more permanent the links to the United States, the greater the
number of activities which become subject to United States jurisdiction. Id.
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lead to international outcry.' 99 However, it is relatively
undisputed that a nation may exert jurisdiction over con-
duct which adversely affects those who are located within
its borders. 20 0 The cases which generally cause the polit-
ical tensions are the more tenuously connected cases. By
eliminating tenuously connected cases at the outset, inter-
national objection is likely to be less severe.
Consideration of economic rather than political factors
is especially appropriate in international aviation. It is dif-
ficult to argue that the United States should be able to
regulate foreign carriers economically merely because
United States carriers compete within those foreign coun-
tries. On the other hand, when a carrier avails itself of the
United States market, it must be prepared to submit to
United States regulation. When United States consumers
bear a significant portion of the burden of anticompetitive
conduct, the United States has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from economic harm.
1w It might be argued that foreign governments would be displeased with any-
thing the United States does, short of eliminating extraterritorial jurisdictional-
together. Cf Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry concluded that
United States antitrust action threatened British trading interests).
211"1 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. But see P. BARLOW, supra note 7, at 106-08 (summariz-
ing arguments that the effects doctrine violates international law). Note, however,
that commentators concerned with the legality of the United States' extraterrito-
rial application of its antitrust laws would not require countries to adhere to
strictly territorial notions ofjurisdiction. Id. Thus the debate is not over whether
it is valid to apply United States law to foreign citizens. Rather, the argument is
over precisely what circumstances justify application to foreign citizens or con-
duct. Because this is essentially a line-drawing dispute, the debate is certain to be
endless.
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